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I. INTRODUCTION
"Horrific, deplorable violence is okay, as long as people don't say any
naughty words!"
- Kyle's Mom, South Park'
The motion picture industry is a major market in the United States and
the world alike, and is continuing to grow even larger.2 But, as the industry is
growing, more and more production companies are getting increasingly
smaller, while a very concentrated few of the studios are gaining steam and
maintaining that momentum. What do these studios have in common? Each of
the six largest studios is a member of the Motion Picture Association of
America ("MPAA"), an organization providing an independent, voluntary
ratings system for theatrically released films.3 Most people know about the
MPAA, as they have likely been subjected to its guidelines for a majority of
their lives. The MPAA designates ratings to movies and categorizes the films
into five categories: G, PG, PG-13, R, and NC-17.4 However, most people
probably do not know about the MPAA's arbitrary, unjust, and outdated
ratings system-the Classification and Ratings Administration System
("CARA").
In short, CARA is a voluntary ratings system,6 operated by the MPAA,
in which a group of undisclosed parents rate films in an effort to inform all
other parents of the films' appropriateness. Though the ratings system is held
out as a voluntary system, submission to the ratings system has become a de
facto standard in the industry, compelling submission for an MPAA rating in
order to be shown in theaters and, in turn, to make money.8 The raters remain
undisclosed and all remarks and ballots are held confidential, with no guide to
assist studios in how they might improve their movie's rating. Further, the
I Simran Khurana, Funny "South Park" Quotes, ABouT.coM,
http://quotations.about.com/od/southparkquotes/alsouthpark2.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
This quote is South Park co-creator Matt Stone's way of mocking the arbitrary movie ratings
system employed by the Motion Picture Association of America.
2 See infra Part III.A.
3 See infra Parts II.A.2, II.A.4.
4 See infra Part II.A.2.
s See generally Margaret Hartmann, Ridley Scott Slams the MPAA over Prometheus Rating,
HOLLYWOOD.COM (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.hollywood.com/news/RidleyScottSlamstheMPAAOverPrometheusRating/23
612948 (acclaimed director Ridley Scott expresses similar notions about the MPAA and its
system CARA).
6 See infra Part II.A.3. Most would likely recognize this as the G, PG, PG-13, R, and NC-17
ratings system found attached to motion pictures.
See infra Part II.A.3.
8 See infra Part III.B.1.a.
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member-studios of the MPAA often receive a significant amount of deference,9
receiving more favorable ratingso even though the ratings may not be justified
by the content of the movies.'
To better understand the absurdity of the system, consider an
illustration:
You are a student aspiring to be published in the school journal, as that
is the only medium in which you can reach readers. Your grade on your article
determines the amount of readers your work will reach ("A" papers are
published in more editions than are lower grades, etc.). Your grade is not based
upon style or journalistic quality, but on appropriateness of the content in
regards to the assignment.
Excited about what lies ahead, you finish your article. You are told you
do not have to submit it for grading, but you know that is the only way it will
be published and reach readers. You submit your article for grading with high
hopes for the potential to reach such an audience. But when you receive your
grade, a "C," you are quite frustrated, as much fewer readers will get to see
your work in the journal. You are told you can re-submit your article, but all
grading notes are confidential and the name of your grader will not be
disclosed. And since there is no rubric, you don't know what needs to be
changed in your article in order to improve your score.
Still frustrated, you compare your paper to others in the class. You find
that your article bears a striking resemblance to the six highest graded papers.
As it tums out, these six students' parents have ties to the administration, and
the grader knew of the affiliations when the articles were graded. Even though
your article is substantially the same as those that received an "A," these six
students will be published in every edition of the journal and you will not. You
are left blind as to what could be done to your article in order to receive a better
grade, leaving you to guess as to how you should edit your work.
Throughout the year, the same six students receive the best marks and
reach the most readers. Despite your best efforts to guess at the desires of the
graders, you have been unable to raise your grade. You are left behind while
the same six students grow and maintain their audience.
There is a reason that grading submissions in academic institutions do
not follow this model-it is arbitrary, inconsistent, and unjust. This model,
though amplified for the sake of illustration, closely reflects the design of the
MPAA/CARA ratings system in terms of deference given to the six major
players in the course.12
9 See infra Parts II.A.4, III.B.l.c.
10 As seen in Parts I1.B.1.a and III.B.l.c, some ratings have greater potential for profitability
and some even serve as a death sentence for the profitability of a movie.
" See infra Part III.B.1.b.
12 Throughout this Note, it helps to relate back to this analogy to better understand the
premise of the issues with the MPAA rating system.
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This Note argues that the MPAA, through its members, or vice versa,
has obtained, or is on its way to obtaining, monopoly power in the motion
picture industry, as the member production companies (comprising the MPAA)
have attained a collective market share of nearly 80% in the industry. Using
this monopoly power to its advantage, the MPAA has constructed a significant
barrier of entry into the market through its compulsory, vague, and deferential
Classification and Ratings Administration rating system. 14 By using monopoly
power to create this ratings barrier, the MPAA has stunted the potential for
growth of non-member production companies, 5 demonstrating anticompetitive
conduct that restricts industry competition in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act").16
In Part II.A, this Note briefly discusses the genesis of the MPAA, the
endurance of the MPAA, the CARA ratings system, and the studios comprising
the MPAA as its members. In Part II.B, a "teaser trailer" into antitrust law will
introduce the policies reinforcing the body of law and will establish the
elements and considerations taken into account when determining a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (monopoly power in the relevant market and the
construction of market entry barriers).
In Part III, the Section 2 analysis is tailored to the MPAA's position in
the movie industry, attempting to prove monopolization, or attempted
monopolization, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Parts III.A and III.B
proceed to show the breadth of the MPAA's overwhelming monopoly power in
the relevant market and that the ratings system has constructed an entry barrier
that allows for further concentration of MPAA member market power. Part
III.B, in particular, discusses how the CARA system is an entry barrier
comprised of an involuntary, vague, and deferential system that hides behind a
cloak of nondisclosure.
The MPAA and its members have succeeded in achieving monopoly
power in the relevant movie market and have demonstrated anticompetitive
conduct in constructing a significant market barrier to entry through the CARA
ratings system. As the student from the illustration would say, "School is out
for the MPAA and its members."
II. BACKGROUND
In tailoring the Section 2 analysis concerning monopoly power and
anticompetitive conduct to the MPAA, it is important to understand the history
of the organization, its practices, and its members prior to learning the law.
Relevant portions of the law should then be understood and applied to the
13 See infra Part III.A.
14 See infra Parts II.A.3, III.B.
15 See infra Parts II.A.3, III.B.
16 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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organization and industry at issue. As such, Part II.A begins to explain the
genesis of the MPAA and its endurance until today, progressing to explain
some of its practices and detailing the members that comprise the organization.
Part II.B then explains the foundations of the Sherman Act and addresses the
specific factors to be considered in tailoring the Section 2 analysis to the
MPAA and the movie industry.
A. History and Make-Up of the MPAA
To better understand the MPAA and its practices, this Part discusses
the nature of the MPAA from its formation until now. Part II.A.1 explores the
censorship that once controlled the motion picture market. Part II.A.2 covers
the origin of the MPAA and establishes the practices that have endured through
today. Part II.A.3 highlights the CARA movie ratings system partly at issue in
this Note, simply stating the operational aspects of the system. Lastly, Part
II.A.4 lists the movie production companies that make up the MPAA and
oversee much of its operations.
1. Saving Us from Censorship
In the early 1900s, American cinema was subject to several local, city,
and state censorship boards across the country.17 At the time, films lacked
Constitutional protection under the First Amendment, requiring licensure by
state mandated censoring regimes prior to allowing a movie's release.1 8s
Because of this, filmmakers had to tailor their movies to the requirements of
each board or otherwise face being banned from that market.19
In 1922, in response to public objection to the perceived immorality of
mainstream films and the growing efforts of city and state governments to
censor films,2 0 the presidents of the major motion picture studios, including
17 See Ken Robichaux, Movie Censorship in the United States, THE PICTURE SHow MAN
(2007), http://www.pictureshowman.com/articlesgenhist-censorship.cfm. See generally Ratings
History, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/ratings-history (last visited Sept. 12, 2013)
[hereinafter Ratings History].
18 See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. Thompson, 171 N.E. 742 (Ill. 1930); Edwards v.
Thompson, 262 Ill. App. 520 (1931); Illinois ex rel. Guggenheim v. City of Chicago, 209 Ill.
App. 582 (1918); Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 154 N.W. 964 (Minn. 1915); Message
Photo-Play Co., Inc. v. Bell, 179 A.D. 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917); In re Goldwyn Distrib. Corp.,
108 A. 816 (Pa. 1919); see also Jason K. Albosta, Note, Dr. Strange-Rating or: How I Learned
that the Motion Picture Association of America's Film Rating System Constitutes False
Advertising, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 115 (2009).
'9 See, e.g., United Artists Corp., 171 N.E. 742; Edwards, 262 Ill. App. 520; Guggenheim,
209 Ill. App. 582; Bainbridge, 154 N.W. 964; Message Photo-Play Co., 179 A.D. 13; In re
Goldwyn Distrib., 108 A. 816; see also Albosta, supra note 18.
20 See GREGORY D. BLACK, HOLLYWOOD CENSORED: MORALITY CODES, CATHOLICS, AND THE
MOVIES (Cambridge Univ. Press 1994); ROBERT SKLAR, MOVIE-MADE AMERICA: A CULTURAL
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Samuel Goldwyn, Louis B. Mayer, Jesse Lasky, and Joseph Schenck, formed
the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association of America
("MPPDAA") to resist swelling calls for government censorship of American
films."1 In addition, the founders of the non-profit trade association wanted to
foster a more favorable public image for the motion picture industry and
safeguard the role of then-silent films' place in mainstream America; this
required submitting movies for approval prior to distribution.2 2 The MPPDAA
later became the MPAA.23
2. Genesis and Endurance of the MPAA
The MPAA made its initial attempt to assume responsibility of
controlling the content of publicly exhibited films in 1930 when it adopted the
Motion Picture Production Code, which listed content prohibited from
depiction in cinema.24 Former Postmaster General William Hays, a member of
President Warren Harding's Cabinet, led the organization and instituted
initiatives to forestall government interference in filmmaking.2 5 He oversaw the
creation of The Production Code, which later assumed the title "The Hays
Code," a regime requiring the review of all film scripts to ensure the absence of
"offensive" material.26 The Hays Code imposed a detailed and extensive list of
rules on filmmakers. Only "correct standards of life" could be presented.27 For
example, there could be no depictions of childbirth, no criticisms of religion,
"lustful" kissing, or "suggestive" dancing, to name a few.28 Under the Hays
Code, films were simply approved or disapproved based on whether they were
deemed "moral" or "immoral."29
HISTORY OF AMERICAN MOVIES (Vintage Books 1994); see also DAVID M. WAGUESPACK & OLAV
SORENSON, THE RATINGS GAME: ASYMMETRY IN CLASSIFICATION 10 (2010), available at
http://orgsci.joumal.informs.org/content/22/3/541.full.pdf; Motion Picture Association of
America, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/394174/Motion-Picture-Association-of-America
(last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
21 History of the MPAA, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/about/history (last visited Sept. 5,
2013) [hereinafter MPAA History]; see also WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 10.
22 MPAA History, supra note 21; Ratings History, supra note 17.
23 See WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 10 n. 1. Any further reference to the
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association of America or the Motion Picture
Association of America in this Note will be noted as the "MPAA."
24 See Motion Picture Association ofAmerica, supra note 20.
25 MPAA History, supra note 21.
26 Id.; see also WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 10-11.
27 MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION CODE OF 1930 (The Hays Code), available at
http://www.artsreformation.com/a001/hays-code.html.
28 Id
29 Ratings History, supra note 17.
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In 1945, former United States Chamber of Commerce President Eric
Johnston succeeded Hays.30 Johnston added to his mission the promotion of
American films, 3' which were gaining in popularity overseas in the post-World
War II era.
In the late 1960s, alongside the progress of the civil rights, women's
rights, and labor movements, a new kind of American film was emerging: frank
and open.32 Amid our society's expanding freedoms, the measures in place had
become outdated and ineffective because of the more relaxed social and sexual
standards of the time. In 1966, former Special Assistant to President Lyndon
Johnson, Jack Valenti, was named MPAA president.34 That same year,
sweeping revisions were made to the Hays Code to reflect changing social
mores, liberalizing the code.3s
In 1968, Valenti, who went on to hold the position for thirty-eight
years, founded the voluntary film rating system, CARA, with its core
purpose of informing parents about the content of films so they could determine
what movies were appropriate for their kids. The ratings established were G,
M, R, and X, which were later replaced by the ratings G, PG, PG-13, R, and
NC- 17. Valenti abhorred the Hays Code's strict limitations on artistic
freedom, noting "there was about this stem, forbidding catalogue of '[d]o's and
[d]ont's' the odious smell of censorship."3 Valenti reached out to the National
Association of Theatre Owners ("NATO") and other stakeholders in
developing his new system.4 0 Out of this effort came the very simple notion
that continues to define the rating system today: movies would no longer be
"approved" or "disapproved."41 Instead, an independent ratings body,
30 MPAA History, supra note 21.
31 See DAVID PUTTNAM, MOVIES AND MONEY (Vintage Books 1997); MPAA History, supra
note 21. American movies lost popularity as preferences switched to television during World
War II. The Hays Code came under consumer pressure due to the switch and filmmakers saw
riskier material as a way to bring back audiences to the silver screen.
32 MPAA History, supra note 21.
33 Motion Picture Association ofAmerica, supra note 20.
34 MPAA History, supra note 21.
3 Motion Picture Association ofAmerica, supra note 20.
36 MPAA History, supra note 21.
3 See infra Part II.A.3.
38 WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 12; Motion Picture Association of America,
supra note 20.
39 TERRY CHRISTENSEN & PETER J. HAAS, PROJECTING POLITICS: POLITICAL MESSAGES IN
AMERICAN FILMS 47 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2005).
40 See 150 CONG. REC. 18,046 (2004); JON LEWIS, HOLLYWOOD v. HARD CORE: HOW THE
STRUGGLE OVER CENSORSHIP SAVED THE MODERN FILM INDUSTRY 150 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2002);
see also Part II.A.3.
41 Ratings History, supra note 17; see also Part II.A.3.
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comprised of anonymous parents, would give advance cautionary warnings to
parents so that they could make informed decisions about which films their
children could see.42 More than forty years later, the system still exists.43
Following Jack Valenti's retirement in 2004, former Kansas
Congressman and United States Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman was
selected as MPAA Chairman and CEO. Glickman, who held the post until the
spring of 2010, led the association during a period of significant industry
transformation into the digital era and an epidemic of online copyright theft."
Today, under the leadership of Chairman and CEO Chris Dodd, the
MPAA "continues to champion the creative and artistic freedoms of
filmmakers, while working to rally public and private institutions around the
world to the cause of safeguarding intellectual property rights, advancing
technology-driven innovation, and openinf markets to the uniquely powerful
and increasingly global medium of film." Throughout its history and into the
modern era, the MPAA holds true to maintaining its mission to advance the
business and the art of filmmaking and its enjoyment around the world.46 The
effectiveness of the MPAA's rating system has been heavily debated for many
years and both sides have genuine concerns that have postponed any real
action.4 7
3. Classifications and Ratings Administration (Current System)
The CARA movie ratings system48 is a voluntary system operated by
the MPAA and NATO. The ratings are given by a board of Tarents who view
each film and, after a group discussion, vote on its rating. The ratings are
intended to provide parents with information in advance so they can decide for
42 Ratings History, supra note 17; see STEPHEN FARBER, THE MOVIE RATINGS GAME (Public
Affairs Press 1972); see also Part II.A.3.
43 MPAA History, supra note 21; Ratings History, supra note 17.
MPAA History, supra note 21.
45 Id
4 Id.
47 See Scott Beggs, The MPAA Must Die, FILM SCHOOL REJECTS (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.filmschoolrejects.com/opinions/the-mpaa-must-die-and-how-you-can-help-make-
that-happen.php (the organization has drafted a petition to end the MPAA). See generally The
MPAA: The Motion Picture Atrocity of America, DONOTCENSOR.BLOGSPOT (Mar. 17, 2008),
http://donotcensor.blogspot.com/2008/03/pros-and-cons.html (demonstrating some of the
concerns).
48 The MPAA also rates film trailers, print advertising, posters, and other media used to
promote films. How does the MPAA Rate Movies?, INNOVATEUS.NET,
http://www.innovateus.net/innopedia/how-does-mpaa-rate-movies (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
49 Clifton Smith, This Documents is Rated X... for Aberrational Honesty: Arguments for
Ignoring MPAA Ratings, [SIC] MAG., http://sicmagazine.org/mpaa/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
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themselves which films are appropriate for their own children.50 The Board
uses criteria "any parent" might use when making a judgment.5 ' Theme,
language, violence, nudity, sex, and drug use are among content areas
considered in the decision-making process.52
The raters of films remain undisclosed to studios and all ballots and
remarks cast by the raters remain confidential, leaving no recommendations for
filmmakers as to how they can improve their MPAA rating if it is
unfavorable. Upon receiving a rating, filmmakers may accept the rating, edit
and resubmit the movie, appeal the rating, or simply reject the rating altogether,
leaving the film dormant in terms of profitability potential, as most theaters will
not accept unrated films. 5 4
4. "Members" of the MPAA
Although the MPAA does not like to disclose its raters, it is not so
bashful about disclosing the identities of the studios that comprise its members.
The MPAA proudly lists its members as the "six major U.S. motion picture
studios": Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures; Paramount Pictures
Corporation; Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.; Twentieth Century Fox Film
CoT oration; Universal City Studios, LLC; and Warner Bros. Entertainment,
Inc. ' These six production companies combine to form the members of the
MPAA as a single ratings issuance organization with the purpose of
administrating film ratings, combatting illegal piracy, and controlling the
distribution of films.56 Further, the MPAA website advertises movies for each
of its member-studios on its home page and bares all six of the studios'
trademarks; non-member films and studios are nowhere to be found.57
so Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.; WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 12-13.
5 Scott Bowles, Debating the MPAA's Mission, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2007, 9:56 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2007-04-09-movie-ratings-main_N.htm;
Smith, supra note 49; see infra Parts III.B.1.a, III.B.1.d.
54 See WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 12 (citing Questions & Answers:
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Movie Rating System, CARA (2008),
http://www.filmratings.com/questions.htm). The unfavorable practices of the ratings system are
discussed in Part III.B.
ss About Us, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/about (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) [hereinafter
About Us]. See infra Part III.A to see how "major" these six studios really are.
56 What is the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)?, WISE GEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-motion-picture-association-of-america-mpaa.htm (last
visited Sept. 5, 2013).
s7 Motion Picture Association ofAmerica, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org (last visited Sept. 5,
2013) [hereinafter MPAA]. This may also help show the deference given to the MPAA members
in the CARA ratings system, as noted in infra Part III.B.1.c. Non-member films are, obviously,
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B. A "Teaser Trailer" of the Sherman Act
The spirit of unfettered market competition is important and essential
to the market economy of the United States.ss This is so true that Congress
believed that consumers deserved protection from the failures of natural
competition.59 Monopolistic schemes frustrate natural competition in such a
way that Congress felt the need to create the Sherman Act 6 0 to protect
consumers and the spirit of competition.6 1 The Sherman Act thus protects
consumers and attempts to cure such market failures by promoting unfettered
competition in order to best allocate economic resources, achieve the lowest
prices, and create the highest quality products.62
First, Part II.B. 1 steps through some of the foundations of the Sherman
Act and explains some of the policies reinforcing the Act's creation. Later, in
Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3, the intricacies of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
obtaining monopoly power in the relevant market, are fleshed out, allowing
specific tailoring of the Act's workings and elements to the motion picture
industry and the MPAA's actions therein.
1. Foundational Reasoning of the Sherman Act
The focus of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,63 and the Sherman Act in
general, is not to prevent companies from using monopoly power that certain
legitimacies of success have created, but rather to protect the spirit of
competition spurring from a firm's efforts to succeed.64 The Supreme Court of
the United States has instructed that the purpose is not actually to protect
businesses from natural workings of the market, but to protect public
included if they were in collaboration with an MPAA member, but the non-member studio's
name is detached. The identity and size of the members comprising the MPAA is important in
demonstrating monopoly power and anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
58 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT AND
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT ch. 1 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/23668l.htm. This 2008 Report was withdrawn in 2009
for raising too many hurdles to antitrust enforcement by the government, making it more difficult
for the department to prosecute. The changes were made to weaken the hurdles and allow more
aggressive prosecuting, not for lack of legal authority contained in the Report. The legal
principles cited in the Report are still accurate. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice
Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law, (May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2009/245710.htm.
5 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
60 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
61 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, at ch.1.
62 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
63 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
6 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, at ch.1.
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consumers from certain failures of the market. 5 The law essentially aims at
encouraging all firms, dominating and challenging alike, to continue to strive to
best competitors; this is done by preventing firms from achieving certain
monopolistic levels and from taking steps to cement their existing monopoly
power through means incompatible with competition's natural process.66 As the
Supreme Court has explained:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter
of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices,
the highest quality and the greatest material progress . . . .
In essence, the natural process of free competition spurs companies to
reduce costs, improve the quality of offerings to the public and consumers, to
innovate and invent products and services, to inform consumers, and to
participate in a wide variety of other activities that will benefit consumers'
welfare as a whole. Competition is, at its basic elements, the process by which
more efficient companies beat out those less efficient; in theory, society's
resources naturally become allocated in the most efficient manner possible.68
Thus, efficient firms may collect business from the unsatisfied customers of
their less efficient rival. This is precisely the type of competitive action that
promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act fosters.69
The focus, though, is not always on economic factors.7 0 There is a
certain judicial preference in decentralizing economic power, reducing the
scope within which private discretion can be used in matters materially
affecting others' welfare, enhancing the opportunity for people to exercise
independent entrepreneurial impulses and, most importantly, recognizing the
social preference for the small instead of the large, as is the foundation and
purpose of the Act.
65 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
66 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,supra note 58, at ch.1.
67 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4.
68 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, at ch. 1 (citations omitted).
69 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
7o Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker, Attempted Monopolization: Reuniting A Doctrine
Divorced from Its Criminal Law Roots and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 73 MARQ. L. REV.
355, 398 (1990).
71 Id.
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2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
In furthering the foundations of the Sherman Act, specific sections of
the Act are applied to certain situations that create monopolistic tendencies. As
such, Section 2 of the Act is especially applicable to the MPAA (and its
members) and its ratings system. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it
unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other ... to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States.. .. Conviction for monopolizing trade is a felony with quite
high repercussions.7 3
The offense under Section 2 of the Act has two prongs: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.7 4 The first prong of this test has two elements: (a) the
possession of monopoly power (b) in the relevant market. The first element (a)
tends to be the focus of the analysis in the first prong of Section 2 of the Act.
"Monopoly power," according to the Supreme Court, means substantial
market power that is durable rather than fleeting-possessing the requisite
market power with the ability to raise price profitability above what would be
possible in a competitive market or having the power to exclude competition
altogether. 5 In relation, the Supreme Court has recognized that monopoly
power encompasses a substantial amount of market power.76
To identify and prove monopoly power, courts have relied on a
showing of an entity's control of a certain dominant share of relevant markets.77
72 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
73 Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) would be violated in tandem with Section 2 of the Act, as "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States" is declared illegal by Section 1, as well. Id. The analysis of
this Note follows the workings of Section 2 because of the challenges facing Section I based
upon constitutionality concerns, some repealing and preemption rulings, and proposed legislation
that could amend the statute. As Section 2 focuses on the results of Section 1 acts, it is important
to note that any formal prosecution for violation of Section 2 would include the workings of
Section 1 of the Act involving agreements unreasonably restraining competition and affecting
interstate commerce.
74 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
7 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) (defining
market power); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)
(defining monopoly power as power to control prices or exclude competition).
76 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992).
n United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945); see Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. at 571; Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-14 (1946); United
States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir. 1989); Exxon Corp. v.
Berwick Bay Real Estates Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 940 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
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In United States v. Grinnell Corporation,n the Supreme Court held that the
existence of such monopoly power could ordinarily be drawn where an entity
controls a "predominant share of the market."79 And in American Tobacco
Company v. United States,8 0 the Court decided that an entity possessing over
80% market share constituted a "substantial monopoly."8 Other courts have
expanded upon the amount of market share that will suffice to show monopoly
82 te83power, and the Supreme Court has recognized some of the expansions.
Market share has not been the only factor in deciding whether
monopoly power exists. For instance, the Second Circuit will draw an inference
of monopoly power only after "full consideration of the relationship between
market share and other relevant market characteristics."84 In addition to market
share, other factors may be considered in deciding monopoly power, such as
entry barriers; number and size of competitors; degree of market competition;
actual reality of using monopoly power to affect market prices or exclude
competitors; excessive profits, margins, or prices; and absolute size of the
firm. 8
5
In explaining the second prong of Section 2, the "willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident," the Court has reasoned that simply possessing monopoly
power, in and of itself, is not unlawful and is actually quite an important
element in the free-market system.8 6 The opportunities afforded by monopoly
power in the short-term attract "business acumen" in the first place; it
encourages risks that can produce innovation and growth of the economy. In
order to safeguard the incentive to innovate, the Court decided that the
78 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
7 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571.
80 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
81 Am. Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 797.
82 Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424 (90% market share is definitely enough to show
monopoly power); Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 885 F.2d at 694 n.18; Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d
at 187 (70-80% market share is enough to show monopoly power); Exxon Corp., 748 F.2d at 940
(per curiam). Detail is paid to these delineations in Part III.A of this Note.
83 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571 (recognizing the delineation in Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d at 424).
84 Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (these
characteristics include the "strength of the competition, the probable development of the industry,
the barriers to entry, the nature of the anticompetitive conduct[,] and the elasticity of consumer
demand" (citing Int'l Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co. Inc., 812 F.2d 786, 792
(2d. Cir. 1987))).
85 Roszkowski, supra note 70, at 359.
86 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (citing Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570-71).
87 Id.
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possession of monopoly power must be coupled with an element of
anticompetitive conduct (such as collusion, refusals to cooperate, or the
construction of entry barriers) in order to be unlawful.
3. Attempting to Monopolize
As stated in Section 2 of the Sherman Act, an "attempt to monopolize"
is also considered a felony.89 In analyzing attempted monopolization, the same
principles are applied as were applied in monopolization claims (analysis from
Part II.B.2 of this Note). 90 Principally, similar elements must be proven in both
monopolization claims and attempted monopolization claims. An essential
difference, though, is that in attempt claims, monopoly power has not yet been
reached-the defendant is effectively attempting to reach that level of power.
In developing attempted monopolization analysis, courts have added
further requirements beyond those needed for monopolization claims. In
addition to establishing that a defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct,91 courts have required there be a finding of a specific
intent to monopolize, 9 2 that there be entry barriers accelerating exercisable
market power, and that there be a "dangerous probability" of achieving the
sought monopoly power.94
As in monopolization claims, predatory or anticompetitive conduct
serves to prove the second prong of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, "the willful
acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident."95 But certain behaviors must be viewed differently when
conducted by monopolists and those attempting monopolization. 9 6 Conduct that
8 Id.; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985). Notions
of anticompetitive conduct are discussed more in Part III.B of this Note.
89 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
90 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 310 (7th ed.
2012) ("The same principles used in the monopolization context to distinguish aggressive
competition from anticompetitive exclusion thus apply in attempt cases.").
9' Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
92 Id.
AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 227 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see
also United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2005) ("In evaluating
monopoly power, it is not market share that counts, but the ability to maintain market share."
(quoting United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1990))).
94 Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456.
95 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). Refer to Part III.B
of this Note to see requirements for showing anticompetitive conduct.
96 Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d at 187 ("Behavior that otherwise might comply with antitrust
law may be impermissibly exclusionary when practiced by a monopolist.").
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is illegal for a monopolist may be legal for a firm that lacks the requisite
monopoly power-certain conduct may have no anticompetitive effects unless
undertaken by a firm already possessing monopoly power.97
In an attempt to prove defendants in attempted monopolization cases
have harbored specific intent to monopolize, courts have differed. In some
instances, specific intent analysis has been encouraged,9 8 and in others, it has
been abhorred. 99 In cases upholding the analysis, specific intent has not been
viewed as the intent to vigorously compete, but the specific intent to destroy
competition or monopolize.100 Yet other courts have criticized this intent
element as nebulous and distracting from the proper analysis of potential
competitive effects of challenged conduct.'o'
Courts have held that entry barriers, including ones created by the
firm's own conduct, permitting the firm to exercise substantial market power
must be in place for an appreciable period without erosion by new entries or
expansion. 2 That is to say, the power possessed by the firm is durable, not
fleeting or temporary.103 And not only must there be barriers to entry, these
barriers must be significant.' 04
9 Id. For example, drastically undercutting competitors can be anticompetitive, but only in
the instance that a monopolist firm is trying to undercut a smaller competitor, not in the instance
a smaller competitor is trying to oust the larger, monopolistic leader in the market.
98 Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 459.
99 See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Intent does not help to separate competition from attempted
monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard competition .... Stripping intent away brings
the real economic questions to the fore at the same time as it streamlines antitrust litigation.").
1oo Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459.
101 See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d at 1402 (Easterbrook, J.) ("Intent does not
help to separate competition from attempted monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard
competition ... . Stripping intent away brings the real economic questions to the fore at the same
time as it streamlines antitrust litigation."). Because of the fading relevance of specific intent in
these claims, specific intent analysis is outside the scope of, and is not discussed in, this Note.
102 AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 227 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see
also Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d at 188-89 ("In evaluating monopoly power, it is not market
share that counts, but the ability to maintain market share." (quoting United States v. Syufy
Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1990))).
103 Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 695-96 (10th
Cir. 1989) (finding a firm lacked monopoly power because its "ability to charge monopoly prices
will necessarily be temporary"); see, e.g., W. Parcel Express v. UPS, 190 F.3d 974, 975 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding that a firm with an allegedly "dominant share" could not possess monopoly power
because there were no significant "barriers to entry"); Colo. Interstate Gas, 885 F.2d at 695-96
("If the evidence demonstrates that a firm's ability to charge monopoly prices will necessarily be
temporary, the firm will not possess the degree of market power required for the monopolization
offense."); Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (finding that a firm did not have monopoly power when a competitor was able to
supply customer's demand within a year); Borough of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307,
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In finding a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power in
attempted monopolization cases, lower courts have relied on the same factors
used in ascertaining possession of monopoly power in monopolization cases.105
Courts have realized, though, that a lesser quantum of market power can suffice
in proving a dangerous probability of monopoly power.106 This inquiry requires
consideration of "the relevant market and the defendant's ability to lessen or
destroy competition in that market."' 0 7
All in all, antitrust analysis must always be adapted to the particular
configuration and contexts of the industry at issue. os
III. BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE MPAA: THE MAKING OF A MONOPOLY
As mentioned, the appropriate section of the Sherman Act must be
applied to the industry at issue in order to determine illegal monopolistic
behavior. As Section 2 of the Sherman Act is especially appropriate in terms of
the members of the MPAA combining and conspiring with one another,'09 the
specific considerations, outlined in Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3, should be tailored to
the workings of the MPAA and the movie industry. In molding the analysis to
the MPAA and the movie industry, Part III.A uses the collective market share
of the members combining to form the MPAA to show that it has obtained
monopoly power in the relevant market. Further, Part III.B uses the same
collective market share to show that a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power exists, proving that the MPAA is, at the very least, attempting
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
312-14 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming finding that power company did not have monopoly power
when customer could have built its own power line within sixteen months).
104 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam);
see also Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int'l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005) ("In a typical
section 2 case, monopoly power is 'inferred from a firm's possession of a dominant share of a
relevant market that is protected by entry barriers."' (quoting Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51)).
105 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 81 ("Defining a market for an attempted
monopolization claim involves the same steps as defining a market for a monopoly maintenance
claim . . . .") (factors considered by courts include, most importantly, market share and barriers to
entry).
106 See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
minimum showing of market share required in an attempt case is a lower quantum than the
minimum showing required in an actual monopolization case.").
107 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
108 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004). This Note focuses on tailoring this analysis to the movie production industry.
109 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.A.4; infra Part III.A.
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A. Monopoly Power in the Relevant Market
When analyzing the practice of the MPAA and its members, it is easy
to draw the conclusion that a substantial amount of monopoly power exists,
given the overwhelming concentration of media, as a whole, and the increasing
concentration of power of the MPAA members in terms of market share. First
thing's first, though. Six mega-corporation conglomerates own and collectively
control nearly all media in the United States: Time Warner, NBC Universal,
CBS Corporation, Rupert Murdoch's News Corp., Walt Disney, and Viacom. 0
These organizations are often referred to as the "big six" (not to be confused
with the members of the MPAA), as they dominate the news and entertainment
industry and continue to concentrate the segments of the media market that they
do not completely control."' In proving the increasing concentration of media,
author Ben H. Bagdikian tracks the concentration of the market from the early
1980s to 2000:
[I]n 1983, fifty corporations dominated most of every mass
medium and the biggest media merger in history was a $340
million deal . ... [I]n 1987, the fifty companies had shrunk to
twenty-nine .... [I]n 1990, the twenty-nine had shrunk to
twenty-three . . . . [I]n 1997, the biggest firms numbered ten
and involved the $19 billion Disney-ABC deal, at the time the
biggest media merger ever .... [In 2000,] AOL Time
Warner's $350 billion merged corporation [was more than
1,000 times larger [than the biggest deal of 1983].1 2
The "big six" conglomerates own the members of the MPAA." 3
Monopoly power, as mentioned in Part II.B and as laid down by the
Court, has been defined as the power to control prices or exclude
competition.114 It seems apparent that the members of the MPAA have the
power to exclude smaller, competing companies either by the hereditary power
110 Michael Snyder, Who Owns the Media? The Six Monolithic Corporations that Control
Almost Everything We Watch, Hear, and Read, THE EcoNoMIC COLLAPSE (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/who-owns-the-media-the-6-monolithic-
corporations-that-control-almost-everything-we-watch-hear-and-read.
"' Id.
112 BEN H. BAGDIKlAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY xx-xxi (Beacon Press, 6th ed. 2000).
113 Snyder, supra note 110 (much of the information in the chart comes from
mediaowners.com and reveals only a small fraction of the media outlets that these six behemoths
actually own).
114 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) (defining
"market power"); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)
(defining monopoly power as power to control prices or exclude competition); see Am. Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501
(1940); Standard Oil Co. ofN.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
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from their concentrated parent media conglomerates or by the constraints in the
market requiring smaller companies to submit to the "voluntary" MPAA ratings
board, mentioned later in this Note." 5
Further, it could be practically impossible for new, small companies to
produce a movie with the hopes of substantial profit without giving full access
to the MPAA and consequently the will of its members.' 16 For example, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer ("MGM") was a member of the MPAA until 2005, when a
deal with Sony Pictures Entertainment (a more substantial member of the
MPAA) fell through.'17 Though Sony landed a 20% stake in MGM at the end
of negotiations, Sony initially wanted to buy MGM outright, and MGM's
refusal to comply with the outright offer seemed to land it a one-way ticket out
of the MPAA." 8 Even before a market share analysis, the MPAA and its
members seem to entertain at least some initial level of monopoly power in the
relevant market.
1. Using Market Share to Demonstrate Monopoly Power
In deciding whether a firm has the requisite monopoly power in the
relevant market," 9 courts have looked to whether the firm has a high market
share of the relevant market. In developing the market share to monopoly
power correlation, the Second Circuit in United States v. Aluminum Company
of Americal2 0 decided that 90% share of the relevant market was most
definitely an initial indicator of the requisite monopoly power for violation of
Section 2 of the Act.121 Further, as mentioned in Part II.B, anywhere from 70%
to 80% share of the relevant market has been held to indicate, at least initially,
11 See infra Part III.B.1.a.
116 This contention is further communicated in Part Ill.B.
117 Sony and MGM Merger Acquisition, MAPSOFWORLD.COM,
http://finance.mapsofworld.com/merger-acquisition/company/sony-mgm.html (last visited Sept.
4,2013) (MGM stipulated that the deal be done in cooperation with TPG Capital).
118 Id; MPAA, supra note 57 (MGM is no longer a member of the MPAA).
119 Though a simple concept, as an initial matter, the relevant market must be defined in two
contexts: product and geographic. DON MAYER ET AL., LEGAL ASPECTS OF MARKETING AND SALES
ch. 23.6 (1st ed. 2012). Concerning this Note, the product market can be viewed as motion
picture productions and distributions, except where it is specifically identified that the movie
ratings "market" and the productions/distributions market are to be separated for analysis. The
geographic market, in terms of analyzing market share, is considered the U.S./Canada box office
(global data is at times used in this Note to emphasize the scale of the industry world-wide).
120 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
121 Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424; see Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 813-14 (1946).
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acquisition of the requisite monopoly power needed for a Section 2 violation.122
In following this guide in determining violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act (the conspiring of industry competitors to collectively monopolize the
market),123 the market shares of the members comprising the MPAA (a single
organization) must be examined to decide if they collectively hold the requisite
dominant share of the market to reach monopoly power in the relevant market.
To help demonstrate the vastness of the relevant box office market,
some of the MPAA's own statistics may shed some light. In 2011, the global
box office climbed to a staggering $32.6 billion, with a 35% increase in the
Chinese box office in the same year. 124 In the U.S./Canada, in 2011, the box
office grossed $10.2 billion, which is a 6% increase from five years prior.125
Further, more than two-thirds of the entire U.S./Canada population-nearly
221.2 million people-traveled to theaters at least once over the course of
2011, and 51% of these individuals paid to see a 3D movie.126 This industry has
become a staple in American culture and is growing rapidly in other cultures.
Though MPAA member films have declined in number since 2004,
their collective market share has become more and more concentrated.127
Members released just over 140 films, while non-member MPAA rated films
increased to nearly 470 films in 201 1.128 But these statistics, gathered by the
MPAA in its annual report, are somewhat deceptive. Of all 610 movies rated
and released in 2011, 110 films made up 90% of the total box office; likewise,
only two non-member films were in the top twenty-five grossing productions in
2011.129
In 2012, the U.S./Canada box office topped results of 2011, grossing
$10.822 billion.130 Further, in 2012, the six members of the MPAA have
toppled their competition.131 The members of the MPAA make up more than
79% of the gross U.S./Canada box office, leaving only five non-member
studios with a market share over 1%, showing how concentrated this market
122 United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); Colo. Interstate Gas
Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir. 1989); Exxon Corp. v.
Berwick Bay Real Estates Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 940 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
123 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
124 MPAA, THEATRICAL MARKET STATISTICS 2 (2011), available at
http://www.mpaa.org/resources/5bec4ac9-a95e-443b-987b-bff6fb5455a9.pdf.
125 id
126 id.
127 Id. at 16.
128 id.
129 Id. at 16-17.
"0 Studio Market Share, Box OFFICE MoJo,
http:/Iboxofficemojo.com/studio/?debug=O&view-parent&p=.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
131 Id.
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has become.' 32 If the market share to monopoly power correlation standards
from several circuit courts are applied, the MPAA members have reached the
initial level of market share to indicate monopoly power in the relevant
market. 133
2. A Dangerous Probability of Monopoly Power in Attempt
As mentioned in Part II.B.3, courts, commentators, and panelists have
recognized that situations exist where "there [is] a dangerous probability that
the defendant's conduct would propel it from a non-monopolistic share of the
market to a share that would be large enough to constitute a monopoly for
purposes of the monopolization offense." 3 The dangerous probability of
obtaining monopoly power, as mentioned, requires consideration of the ability
to lessen competition in the relevant market-the same factors are used in
assessing monopoly power in monopolization claims while recognizing that a
lower level of market power can suffice in proving attempted
monopolization.'3 5
If nearly 80% of the market (gross box office in the U.S./Canada) is not
enough to demonstrate, at least initially, monopoly power of the MPAA and its
members, then some other facts should be considered in deciding whether there
is a dangerous probability that monopoly power will be obtained. If MGM, who
was booted from the MPAA's membership, were to regain its membership in
the MPAA, a serious amount of revenue would be attributed to the already vast
market share held by the members, further concentrating the already dominant
market share of the MPAA members. 136 For instance, in 2012 alone, Skyfall,137
the latest installment in Ian Fleming's James Bond franchise, and The Hobbit:
An Unexpected Journey,138 another powerful franchise adapted from J.R.R.
Tolkien's children's classic, contributed over $1.36 billion to the worldwide
132 Id (Lionsgate comes the closest to reaching the level of any of the MPAA members,
grasping a 7.3% market share).
133 United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); Colo. Interstate Gas
Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir. 1989); Exxon Corp. v.
Berwick Bay Real Estates Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 940 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
134 Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 885 F.2d at 694.
' Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993); see, e.g., United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) ("Defining a market for
an attempted monopolization claim involves the same steps as defining a market for a monopoly
maintenance claim . . . .") (factors considered by courts include, most importantly, market share
and barriers to entry); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995)
("[T]he minimum showing of market share required in an attempt case is a lower quantum than
the minimum showing required in an actual monopolization case.").
136 See supra Part III.A.
137 SKYFALL (MGM 2012).
138 THE HOBBIT: AN UNEXPECTED JoURNEY (MGM 2012).
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box office totals---each are MGM films.13 9 In the midst of its comeback, MGM
is exploring selling its operations, adding to the expectation that a member
studio will acquire MGM, subsequently adding to the members' collective
market share. 140
Further, in 2010, Lionsgate and MGM were in talks to merge to
become one of the most powerful independent studios with its library of movies
and television shows.14' Though this deal fell through, it was dangerously close
to becoming reality, as major holder of Lionsgate Carl Icahn pushed for the
merger by offering $500 million to MGM to relieve the faltering studio's
debts.142 Had this deal resulted in a merger, and in the event MGM regains its
membership, the MPAA would see its market share push over the 85% mark
and possibly make the push to over 90% of total market share as Lionsgate and
MGM continue to recover.143 With talks that MGM will sell its operations in
the near future, Lionsgate is again listed as a likely purchaser of the studio.'
In assessing a "dangerous probability" in obtaining monopoly power in
attempt cases and in using the same factors as are used in monopolization
cases, the standard from Aluminum Company of America, as mentioned and
applied in Part III.A. 1, seems appropriate.14 5 The dangerous probability of
obtaining a 90% market share is definitely an indicator of the requisite
19 Skyfall Closes in on $1 Billion Worldwide, BUSINESS INSIDER,
http://www.businessinsider.com/skyfall-closes-in-on- 1 -billion-worldwide-heres-your-box-
office-roundup-2012-12 (last visited Sept. 4, 2013); The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey, Box
OFFICE MoJo, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=hobbit.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013)
(these films were still in theaters at the time these statistics were counted, meaning that more box
office revenues were brought in before the films finished running in theaters) (these films were
done in collaboration with MPAA member studios, but the rights to the franchises and the
respective studio revenues add to monopoly power and market share alike).
140 See Brooks Barnes, Latest Overhaul of the MGM Studio Appears to Be a Moneymaker,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 9, 2013, at BI, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/business/mediallatest-overhaul-of-the-mgm-studio-appears-
to-be-a-moneymaker.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
141 Claudi Eller & Ben Fritz, Lions Gate, MGM in Merger Talks, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/24/business/la-fi-ct-mgm-20100624.
142 Icahn Said to Push MGM-Lionsgate Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/icahn-said-to-push-mgm-lions-gate-merger/.
143 See Studio Market Share, supra note 130.
1" Barnes, supra note 140.
145 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945); see United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 813-14 (1946); United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005);
Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir.
1989); Exxon Corp. v. Berwick Bay Real Estates Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 940 (5th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
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monopoly power for a Section 2 violation. 14 6 Because a lesser quantum of
monopoly power has been noted proper when dealing with monopolization
attempt cases, the conclusion that the MPAA members at least possess a
dangerous probability of obtaining monopoly power is especially
appropriate.
Though the evidence lends to the conclusion that the MPAA has
obtained, or is dangerously close to obtaining, monopoly power in the relevant
market, this power must be coupled with an element of anticompetitive
conduct.14 8 Further, entry barriers allowing the exercise of substantial market
power are significant evidence in showing anticompetitive elements of
monopolistic power.14 9 As such, Part III.B serves to prove that the CARA
ratings system employed by the MPAA is a significant entry barrier to the
market, showing anticompetitive behavior coupled with monopoly power.
B. Significant Barriers to Entry: The MPAA Ratings System
Though market share has been a significant marker in determining
whether a firm possesses the requisite monopoly power for a Section 2
violation, other factors have been considered in solidifying the inquiry.150 As
mentioned,' 5' these other factors include entry barriers; number and size of
competitors; degree of market competition; actual reality of using substantial
market power to affect market prices or exclude competitors; excessive profits,
margins, or prices; and absolute size of the firm. Further, entry barriers, even
those created by the firm itself, permitting the firm to exercise substantial
market power for an appreciable period without erosion by other or new entries
or expansions, have become significant evidence in proving monopolistic
power; 52 this power must be durable and not fleeting or temporary.'5 The
146 Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424; see Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571; American
Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 813-14; Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d at 187; Colo. Interstate Gas Co.,
885 F.2d at 694 n.18; Exxon Corp., 748 F.2d at 940.
147 See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
minimum showing of market share required in an attempt case is a lower quantum than the
minimum showing required in an actual monopolization case.").
148 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (emphasis omitted).
149 AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 227 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see
also Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d at 188-89 ("In evaluating monopoly power, it is not market
share that counts, but the ability to maintain market share.") (quoting United States v. Syufy
Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Iso Roszkowski & Brubaker, supra note 70.
151 See supra Part II.B.
152 AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 227 (citations omitted); see also Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d at 188-
89 ("In evaluating monopoly power, it is not market share that counts, but the ability to maintain
market share.") (quoting United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is
accompanied by an element of this anticompetitive conduct.' 54 This Part
focuses mostly on entry barriers in further proving anticompetitive conduct
coupled with monopoly power in the market, as the other factors bear a
correlation to the market share analysis above.'55
1. CARA is an Avenue for Member Deference
As mentioned in Part II.A.3, the ratings system established by the
MPAA is the Classifications and Ratings Administration. This system is
"voluntary" and the MPAA collaborates with NATO in operating the system,
according to the MPAA. 56 Contrary to the MPAA's contentions, this ratings
system creates an entry barrier allowing substantial member deference by
necessitating submission to the system that hides behind a cloak of ambiguity
and non-disclosure.
In Part III.B.L.a, this Note shows how the ratings system is truly
involuntary, requiring submission in order to generate any substantial profit.
Parts III.B. 1.b and III.B. 1.c discuss the ambiguity of the ratings system, which
has allowed a recognizable amount of deference to be given to the members of
the MPAA. Part III.B.1.d continues by detailing the unfair practice of refusing
to disclose raters, which has provided a shelter of excuses for the MPAA and
its members to continue the market constraining activity. Lastly, Part III.B. .e
suggests a simple, proven solution to cure the inadequacies of the system,
lessening the MPAA's ability to use the ratings barrier in maintaining its
monopoly power.
153 See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 695-96
(10th Cir. 1989) (finding a firm lacked monopoly power because its "ability to charge monopoly
prices will necessarily be temporary"); see, e.g., W. Parcel Express v. UPS, 190 F.3d 974, 975
(9th Cir. 1999) (finding that a firm with an allegedly "dominant share" could not possess
monopoly power because there were no significant "barriers to entry"); Williamsburg Wax
Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that a firm
did not have monopoly power when a competitor was able to supply customer's demand within a
year); Borough of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 312-14 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming
finding that power company did not have monopoly power when customer could have built its
own power line within sixteen months).
154 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (emphasis omitted).
15s See supra Part III.A.
156 As is seen in Part IlI.B.1.a, the ratings system is not really "voluntary" at all, nor does the
MPAA "collaborate" with theater owners in enforcing their ratings on the consumers.
407
23
Henry: The MPAA: A Script for an Antitrust Production
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
a. A "Voluntary" Ratings System
As mentioned above,' 57 the MPAA ratings system (CARA) is
voluntary and has no force of law. These notions do not hold so true throughout
the motion picture industry, however, especially if a filmmaker expects a wide
release to theaters to generate large profits for an expensive film. This Part
draws attention to the correlations between ratings and profitability and how
wide-release films depend on submission to the MPAA's system to avoid
industry suicide.
CARA is designed to protect children by informing parents about the
contents of movies.158 Further, children account for roughly one-third of all
film-receipts in theaters; movies that restrict the ability of children to attend
earn less on average. 5 9 Even though the MPAA ratings hold no legal weight,16 0
studios', cinemas', and retailers' participation in the MPAA's system has been
so pervasive for so long that the system has been adopted as a de facto standard
in the industry and is practically mandatory.' 6 Since children make up a large
section of the market and because the MPAA ratings have become a
"requirement" in the industry, production companies much prefer more lenient
ratings.162
Conditional upon the MPAA rating received, films with more explicit
sexual content and more violence will attract more viewers, leaving filmmakers
with an incentive to "push the envelope" of the desired rating category and
further deceiving parents in what their children may see in a film.'63 The PG-13
rating seems to compromise these incentives particularly well, allowing a
younger demographic to be reached while still pushing the boundaries in terms
of sex and violence.' 6 To further demonstrate how profitability hinges on
15 See supra Part II.A.3.
158 See supra Part II.A.3. These ratings do a very poor job of informing parents about any
wary content of a film.
1s1 WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 3.
o60 See infra Part IIB.1.b.
161 AMC Defies APAA Bullies: Will Show Unrated Documentary to Kids with Permission
Slips, TECHDIRT (Mar. 28, 2012, 12:12 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120328/10242818279/amc-defies-mpaa-bullies-will-show-
unrated-documentary-to-kids-with-permission-slips.shtml.
162 WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 3.
163 Id.
' Id. As a side note, the PG-13 ratings system exists mostly thanks to Steven Spielberg.
Spielberg's 1975 film Jaws straddled the line between the then-existing PG and R ratings, and in
1984, the release of his films Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom and Gremlins received
some criticism for the PG ratings due to the fairly graphic scenes in both films. At Spielberg's
behest, the MPAA settled upon the "PG- 13" designation later that year. Kevin Burtt, The History
of the PG-13 Rating, LDS CINEMA ONLiNE, http://motleyvision.org/dscinema/2012/06/the-
history-of-the-pg-13-rating/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). Spielberg's films had generated vast
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ratings, consider some statistics for box office revenues in 2012: PG -
$2,118,490,869; PG-13 - $5,624,694,444; R - $2,969,612,903."6 The category
with the capability to reach a younger target audience but also "push the
envelope" in its content has landed the biggest percentage of revenue out of the
three largest rating categories by gross revenue-PG-13 reigns supreme. Out of
all releases, PG-13 films earn over 50% of gross revenues in the industry.166
Though any film can be released without a rating, it is considered
commercial suicide, pinning the nail in the coffin of a film before it draws its
first breath. Most theaters treat a film that does not bear a rating as if it harbors
something even less favorable-the dreaded NC-17.'6 1 An NC-17 rating
renders a film relatively stagnant and is a rating under which success is nearly
impossible, as most theaters will not show these films at all.'68 These least
favorable ratings (or non-ratings in this case), combined, account for only 0.5%
of the gross revenues in the market, and the NC-17 rating only generated
$2,145,270 in the United States.169 Once the MPAA has handed down this
death sentence, nobody dares touch the project. The project will receive no
promotion or screen time, and nobody outside of film circles would even know
it exists. 170
Non-member Harvey Weinstein, in his battle with the MPAA, as
mentioned later,' 7 ' agrees with these notions. His movie Grindhousel7 2 with all
of its graphic violence brought it perilously close to an NC- 17 rating that would
have kept it from being shown in many theaters or rented or sold in many
stores. Millions were at stake for Weinstein because NC-17 films do not
make money and unrated or independent films seem to perform just as
poorly.174 As Mr. Weinstein recognizes, submitting to the MPAA's system is
amounts of revenue for the MPAA member studios and have continued to do so since the
creation of the PG-13 rating. Steven Spielberg, THE NUMBERS.COM, http://www.the-
numbers.com/person/135430401-Steven-Spielberg (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
165 Yearly Box Office, Box OFFICE MoJ,
http://boxofficemojo.com/yearly/?view2=mpaa&p=.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). In 2012, the
average PG-13 film generated approximately $45.4 million, towering above the $38.5 million PG
film average and the $15.9 million R film average. Id.
166 Id
167 AMC Defies MPAA Bullies, supra note 161.
168 Id.; WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 13.
169 Yearly Box Office, supra note 165.
170 It is important to keep in mind that other avenues of release have been successful for these
unfavorable ratings (or non-ratings) but have not come close to landing the maximized profits
that occur with cinema releases.
171 Weinstein's battle with the MPAA mostly concerns the ambiguity of the CARA ratings
system. Refer to Part IlI.B. 1.b for more information regarding his criticisms of the system.
172 GRINDHOUSE (Weinstein Co. 2007).
173 Bowles, supra note 53.
174 id.
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practically involuntary as it has become somewhat of a mandatory private law
or de facto industry standard by which all with capitalistic ambitions must
succumb in order to exist. 175 The financial improbability of bypassing the
ratings system creates an entry barrier to the market, thereby proving
anticompetitive conduct coupled with monopoly power as determined by
market share. 176
i. "Tying" and the MPAA
As if submission to the MPAA ratings system is not compulsory
enough, the MPAA has taken greater steps to ensure that the involuntary nature
of its system is maintained. In this effort, the MPAA and its member-studios
have contracted and created pressures to force the CARA ratings upon theaters
downstream.1" The MPAA and its members, in creating this contractual
pressure between the two markets, have participated in "tying," an illegal tactic
targeted by the Sherman Act.178
By conditioning the sale of one commodity upon the purchase of
another, a seller compels the relinquishment of buyers' independent judgment
as to the product that is "tied" to another-the tied product is insulated from the
competitive stresses of the open market.'79 These tying agreements ignore the
Sherman Act's policy to let competition rule the markets of trade based upon
the faith that free economy best promotes public wealth and goods must stand
the stem test of competition; tying agreements serve hardly any purpose
besides suppression of competition. And, to the extent the enforcer of a tying
agreement enjoys market control, other potential market players are foreclosed
from offering goods in free competition and are effectively excluded from the
marketplace altogether. i8 A buyer's wielding of lawful monopoly power in one
market becomes unlawful if it is used to coerce concessions that handicap
competitive challenges in another market. 182 Further, monopolistic results do
175 AMC Defies MPAA Bullies, supra note 161.
176 See generally STEPHEN VAUGHN, FREEDOM AND ENTERTAINMENT: RATING THE MOVIES IN
AN AGE OF NEW MEDIA (Cambridge University Press 2005); WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra
note 20, at 13.
1 William Bibbiani, B-Movies Extended: Should the MPAA be Destroyed?, CRAVE ONLINE
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.craveonline.com/film/articles/182565-b-movies-extended-should-the-
mpaa-be-destroyed.
1' Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953) (citing United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-08 (1948)).
1' Id at 605.
180 id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 608 (citing Grifith, 334 U.S. at 106-08).
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not have to be reached for violation of the Sherman Act, as monopolistic
designs are just as easily reached by the Act.'83
As mentioned, CARA has become somewhat of a de facto standard in
the industry and has acquired a quasi force of law. 8 4 In furthering this reaction,
theaters have been making more and more contracts with the big studios, and
independent or non-member filmmakers have been somewhat relegated to
certain "aesthetic ghettos" like the "straight-to-video" or the "online-only"
markets.185 Instead of owning theaters, the member-studios have contracted and
created pressures that force the downstream theaters to abide by their CARA
ratings.186 These contracts also concern how revenue will be split between the
theaters and the studios.' 87 Major studios do not completely depend on the
theaters for their revenue generation, though, they can survive in other market
avenues in the instance a theater will not show a film.'88 This relationship is not
the same for theater owners, as their only chance of survival is to receive the
large blockbusters from the major studios in hopes of generating revenue from
ticket sales and concessions, adding a great amount of pressure to theaters. 89
Part of "playing nice" involves abiding by the MPAA/CARA ratings and
agreeing not to show movies that are not rated by the MPAA.190 The member-
studios stay happy, and their control is sustained.
If the MPAA/CARA ratings can be viewed in a different market than
the MPAA member-studios,'91 it is clear that the members are tying
18 Id. at 622-23 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402 (1927)).
184 See supra Part III.B.1.a.
i8 Bibbiani, supra note 177.
186 The movie industry has come under scrutiny, before, as acting in a monopolistic manner.
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, several major movie production companies were brought
under scrutiny for price fixing, pooling agreements, formula deals, block-booking, competitive
bidding, expansion of theater holdings and divestiture, and intervention practices, among other
questionable practices. 334 U.S. 131 (1948). The Supreme Court ruled that the major production
companies involved could not own the down-stream distribution channels as well. Id. at 177.
Additionally, during the adoption of Valenti's ratings system, Valenti noted that smaller
American independent producers and distributors "will have to accept [the MPAA's]
classification as [the non-member studios] must get booking for their films and exhibitors will
demand that [every film] be classified." LEWIS, supra note 40, at 150.
187 Beggs, supra note 47.
188 For example, online streaming, such as Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon, would suffice in
accelerating a major blockbuster to success.
Beggs, supra note 47; see supra Part III.B.1.a. Imagine if your existence depended upon
the revenue to be generated from huge blockbusters like The Dark Knight Rises or The Avengers.
Theaters typically must play nice or otherwise perish when it comes to this mounted pressure.
190 Beggs, supra note 47.
191 Entertain the possibility of a ratings "market" (as there seems to be one (see Parts III.B. 1.c
and III.B. 1.e for reference to other ratings organizations)) and separate the MPAA members into
their movie producing market in determining whether tying exists between the two markets.
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enforcement of the ratings to receipt of major motion pictures that generate
substantial revenues for theaters. The members are forcing the hand of theaters
into their other practices (ratings) in order to benefit their further collected
monopoly power in the motion picture industry.19 2 Tying the enforcement of
the MPAA/CARA ratings effectively helps the members of the MPAA to
ensure the survival of their antitrust conduit and eliminates any competition
that would stifle their ratings system dominance. This furthers the advantages
gained when MPAA practices yield substantial deference and revenue
generating opportunity based upon the potential audience for each ratings
classification.19 3 Even if the practices of the MPAA and its members do not
yield monopolistic results, this scheme proves that the MPAA bears a
monopolistic design and should equally be reached by the Sherman Act.' 94
This contractual scheme further aggregates the financial improbability
of bypassing the ratings system, solidifying the anticompetitive entry barrier
constructed by the MPAA, and its members,195 for the purpose of ensuring the
maintenance of its monopoly power in the market.
b. Vague Ratings/No Clear Standards
As mentioned above,' 96 a board of parents who view each film and
collectively vote on the rating it deserves determines the CARA ratings
administered by the MPAA.' 97 The MPAA intends these ratings to provide
information to parents in advance so they can decide for themselves whether or
not a film is appropriate for their child.198 The MPAA denies labeling a movie
"good" or "bad" but instead tries to make parents aware of certain elements in
films, including sex, violence, language, nudity, and drug use.' 99 These
guidelines seem to be the MPAA's explanation for statements like, "The
192 See supra Part IILA; LEWIS, supra note 40, at 150.
193 See supra Parts ILA, III.B. La, III.B. 1.c.
194 Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622-23 (1953) (citing United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402 (1927)).
195 LEWIS, supra note 40, at 150 (stating that "the ... motion picture rating system
successfully established a national film censorship standard, but, more importantly, it gave the
[MPAA and its member] studios control over entry into the .. . marketplace").
196 See supra Part II.A.3.
19 Smith, supra note 49; Film Ratings, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/ratings (last visited
Sept. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Film Ratings].
198 Smith, supra note 49; Film Ratings, supra note 197.
199 Smith, supra note 49; Film Ratings, supra note 197. As is seen in this Part, many other
elements creep into the decision-making system without any proper designation or system behind
it, as the rating parents are entitled to their discretion in deciding what other parents would want
to know before letting their child view a film.
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[b]oard uses the same criteria as any parent," 200 even though "any parent" has
no designation or definition, leaving most parents without any true guidelines
to apply in determining whether a film is "appropriate for viewing by their own
children."2 0 1
Harvey Weinstein, a huge player in the movie production industry and
a non-member of the MPAA, has had run-ins with the MPAA and discusses
how vague, ambiguous, and unpredictable the ratings often are, leaving the
companies at the board's whim in determining the ratings or a ruling on an
appeal to the ratings board.20 2 "They're hard to read," says Weinstein,
reaffirming the notion held by most of the industry.2 03 This unpredictability has
become a mounting crux of criticism against the MPAA, accusing the
organization of being inconsistent and out of touch with American mores. 04
The MPAA rebuts the negative arguments about their vague system by
explaining that "[b]y providing clear, concise information, movie ratings
provide timely, relevant information to parents, and they help protect the
freedom of expression of filmmakers and this dynamic American art form." 2 05
Further, CARA claims to be intentionally vague because the organization does
not want to be identified with censorship, as it was developed to extinguish the
inhibiting practice.2 0 6 This argument fails, as vagueness, or the lack thereof,
bears no correlation to censorship.
In demonstrating how practically unpredictable, uninformative, and
ridiculous the system can be, consider a "top ten" list of examples compiled by
Perry Seibert and Jeremy Wheeler of All Movie Guide:
10. Mother's Boys (1994) "Rated R for language and for a
mother's sociopathic behavior"
9. Indian in the Cupboard (1995) "PG for mild language and
brief video images of violence and sexy dancing"
8. AllI Wanna Do (1998) "PG-13 for teen sex-related material,
language, and substance misuse"
7. The Hunted (1997) "R for strong bloody ninja violence and a
humorous drug related scene"
200 Smith, supra note 49.
201 Id.
202 Bowles, supra note 53.
203 id.
204 id.
205 MPAA Ratings, COMING ATTRACTIONS THEATRES,
http://www.catheatres.com/Page.asp?NavlD=277#.UidoiEnD9rO (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
206 See supra Part II.A.1.
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6. War of the Buttons (1994) "PG for mischievous conflict,
some mild language, and bare bottoms"
5. Alien vs. Predator (2004) "PG-13 for violence, language,
horror images, slime, and gore"
4. SkateboardKidl (1995) "PG for brief mild language and an
adolescent punch in the nose"
3. Bushwhacked (1997) "PG for language and a mild birds and
bees discussion"
2. Twister (1996) "PG-13 for intense depiction of very bad
weather"
1. Jefferson in Paris (1995) "PG-13 for mature theme, some
images of violence, and a bawdy puppet show" 207
As if these examples were not bizarre enough, the 2004 movie Team
America: World Police bore the tagline, "graphic crude and sexual humor,
violent images and strong language-all involving puppets."208 In viewing
these examples, it is easy to see how absurd the ratings system really is. These
ratings are uninformative to parents and filmmakers in assessing what is
appropriate for viewers, children, and adults alike. Often, these vague standards
hinder the filmmaking process and delay release, as a producer must re-edit and
re-submit a film if a rating is unsatisfying.209 And, out of fear of creating an
implicit contract, the MPAA/CARA will not advise filmmakers as to how they
207 Matt Holmes, The MPAA's Top Ten Dumb Rating Descriptions, WHATCULTURE (Sept. 13,
2007), http://whatculture.com/film/the-mpaas-top-ten-silliest-rating-reasons.php.
208 Id As a note, the film The King's Speech was rated R based purely on a thirty-second
scene in which swear words were used. The Weinstein Company (a non-member production
studio) was told that if three of the five uses of a certain swear word were muted, the picture
would receive a lesser rating than its current R rating. After removing two swear words, an
alternative version of the film received the more favorable PG-13 rating. Prominent film critic
Roger Ebert expressly criticized the MPAA in his review, as did other critics and film makers.
Nikki Finke, MPAA Gives Oscar Fave 'The King's Speech' PG-13 Rating for Removing Two
Swear Words, DEADLINE.COM (Feb. 25, 2011, 2:36 PM),
http://www.deadline.com/2011/02/mpaa-gives-oscar-frontrunner-the-kings-speech-pg- 13-rating-
for-removing-two-swear-words/.
209 How does the MPAA Rate Movies?, supra note 48.
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could receive a less restrictive rating.210 This tends to create a system where
"[n]o information gets out at all . .. like a black hole."21 1
In further proving the outlandishly vague nature of the ratings system,
case law has lent a hand, concluding that the ratings are unconstitutionally
vague when adopted by state law.212 The MPAA avoids constitutional
challenges in most cases, though, because it is not a governmental
organization2 13 and the ratings are not actually laws to be enforced.2 14
In 1970, Pennsylvania modified its Penal Code by adding to it a
Section applying the CARA/MPAA rating standards as law. 2 15 The district
court stated that "[o]ne thing is immediately apparent. The ratings employed by
the [MPAA] do not correspond to the statutory standards of 'suitable' or 'not
suitable for family or children's viewing."' 216 The district court went on to state
that "[t]he evidence clearly establishe[s] that the [Ratings Administration] of
the [MPAA] has itself no defined standards or criteria against which to measure
its ratings" 217 and that the system is "so patently vague . . . as to render it
unconstitutional."2 18 The district court criticized the structure of the ratings
system: "Twelve persons, four in New York and eight on the Pacific coast, do
the rating, a voluntary [MPAA] undertaking. Films viewed are simply graded
according to the individual reactions of the viewing members." 219 This system
and the criticism thereof bare a striking resemblance to the system employed by
the MPAA today, hearkening back to arguments about the lack of definition
and clear-cut standards in the ratings system.220
The vague nature of the CARA rating system does not show
monopolistic activity in and of itself, but shows a structure that is susceptible to
21o WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 14.
211 Id. (citations omitted).
212 Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. Specter, 315 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
213 See supra Part II.A.
214 This Note, in Part III.B..a.i, shows that even though the ratings are not law enforced by
the hand of the government, theaters must enforce the ratings as private law in order to receive
distribution from the members of the MPAA and, in turn, to make any profits from the major
blockbusters.
215 Motion Picture Ass'n ofAm., 315 F. Supp. 824.
216 Id. at 825.
217 id
218 Id. at 826 (citing Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968)).
219 Id. It should be noted that this case involved the prior ratings system employed by the
MPAA. The guidelines are very similar and, in reality, only the letter designations (i.e., R, PG,
etc.) were changed (the system has been cited for its long enduring tenure as the set "standard"
for rating motion pictures). See supra Parts II.A.3, III.B.1.a.
220 In Part III.B. 1.c, the "vagueness" of these standards is referred to as a means for the MPAA
to show deference to its members and facilitate their already concentrated market share and
monopoly power.
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manipulation and favoritism. As such, this ambiguously operated ratings
system has allowed the MPAA to show great deference to its members,
resulting in monopolistic tendencies further solidifying the maintenance of
monopoly power through this manipulable, anticompetitive entry barrier.
c. Deference to Members: Anticompetitive Conduct
The MPAA is often criticized as harboring a certain bias for its
members' big-budget studio films. 2 2 1 David Waguespack 2 22 and Olav
Sorenson 22 3 have conducted a thorough study of the MPAA's rating system and
have collected empirical evidence recording the bias lent by the MPAA to its
members. This Part focuses on Waguespack and Sorenson's piece The Ratings
Game: Asymmetry in Classification.2 24
The authors' work focuses on the notion that when industry
participants enact restrictive codes, the enacted regulations essentially help to
ensure sustained profitability of the participants as to promote the public
good.225 It goes on to note, "[s]ince the ratings that films receive have real
consequences in terms of their sales, and hence for profitability, the MPAA
rating system serves as a stratifying device, preventing lower status participants
from matching the profitability of the more prominent players in the
industry." 2 2 6
The authors' findings highlight three things. First, classifications like
those enacted by the MPAA can catalyze cumulative advantage; this is even the
case when categories do not reflect quality but nonetheless have differing
values.227 Second, the potential for asymmetry in these systems increases when
the organizations involved can influence their classification or228 thr
categorization. And third, the extent to which this categorization can
contribute to stratification depends on ambiguity in the mapping of category
attributes. Without ambiguity, bias in the system would likely delegitimize the
classification system itself-there would be no cloak of ambiguity to hide the
221 The MPAA: The Motion Picture Atrocity ofAmerica, supra note 47.
222 Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland.
223 School of Management, Yale University.
224 WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20.
225 Id. at 4.
226 id
227 Id. at 4-5.
228 Id. at 5.
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bias.2 29 The authors then mapped out three primary routes in which such an
asymmetry might emerge: power, a halo effect, and proto-typicality.230
The power route potential for asymmetry is particularly potent when
two conditions occur: (1) when production companies perceive one
classification as more valuable than another, and (2) when these companies
have the ability to influence the classification process. 2 3 ' Together, these
conditions give motive and means to the possessor.2 32 As mentioned,233
different ratings categories do entail more value, as it can mean the difference
in millions of dollars. Accordingly, the members of the MPAA (and the rest of
the market) meet the first prong of this "power" test. But, the members of the
MPAA are in a rather unique position when it comes to the second prong,
allowing them a means to further progress their motives and desired results.
A halo effect can occur when a rater is simply aware of the producer of
an offering. 235 This lends to sorting these "high-status" or preferred producers
into categories or rating classifications that are perceived as having a higher
value, placing a "halo" over the identity of a producer that "can do no
wrong."236 This, again, leaves the members of the MPAA in a unique position,
as they are the most profitable production companies and have strong
affiliations with the MPAA. Even if not on purpose, the members may receive
the benefits of rater bias in submitting films to the system.
The third route of asymmetry suggested by the authors is proto-
typicality. Proto-typicality exists when a certain production company becomes
strongly identified with some particular category, such as family films, action
blockbusters, or any other category.2 37 For example, audiences and raters alike
may genuinely view a scene as less threatening simply because Disney has
offered to distribute the film. 2 38 The raters may also be affected by this proto-
typicality when viewing offerings of the members of the MPAA.
As demonstrated, there are some obvious ways that bias can exist in the
MPAA/CARA rating system and, regardless of the pathway of bias employed,
one would expect higher status producers to receive more desirable
229 Id. This draws a parallel to how the MPAA and its members use their practices to help
facilitate their own bias without being blatantly discoverable by outsiders.
230 Id. at 6.
231 id.
232 id
233 See Part IIB.1l.a.
234 This is discussed more, below.
235 WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 7.
236 Id. at 7-8 (the phrase "can do no wrong" is not found in the cited material, but is used in
commonality to emphasize the bias given to the "high-status" producers).
237 Id. at 8-9.
238 Id. at 9.
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designations. 23 9 But without underlying information, identifying biases cannot
be distinguished as stemming from the identities of the producers or simply
from the contents of the films offered for ratings. 24 0
In gathering this underlying information, Waguespack and Sorenson
analyzed data collected by Kids-in-Mind, a website created to provide arents
with more detailed, objective information about the contents of movies. 41 The
website designates three scores on a zero to ten point scale based upon sex,
violence, and profanity, adding the three into a composite thirty point total.24 2
The authors plotted the Kids-in-Mind scores against the ratings dealt by the
MPAA and found some interesting results.243 Each rating category used by the
MPAA (G, PG, PG-13, R, NC-17) significantly overlapped the distribution of
other categories, and each category had very murky borders.2 " This helps point
out the substantial ambiguity of the system when assigning ratings to films.
The authors went on to compile data concerning MPAA member film
ratings compared to the composite score awarded by Kids-in-Mind.245 The data
compiled begins to answer the question of whether the identities of production
companies influence the assignment of ratings to films. 2 4 6 Though more mature
content tended to increase the proportion of films with an R rating, a gap
between member and non-members exists. 24 7 For example, of non-member
films receiving a content Kids-in-Mind composite score of twelve, 40% of the
films had been dealt an R rating by the MPAA.248 This draws a distinct contrast
to the treatment of members, as only 20% of these offerings receiving an
identical Kids-in-Mind score received an R rating from the MPAA. 2 49 At a
certain level of content, higher status producers appeared to receive less
restrictive ratings.250
Waguespack and Sorenson determined that MPAA member films, on
average, have a 24.2% lower unconditional probability of receiving an R
239 Id. at 8.
240 Id. at 9.
241 Id at 15; see KIDS IN MiND, http://www.kids-in-mind.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
242 KIDS IN MIND, supra note 241. These scores were crossed referenced to another
independent ratings site, Screen It, and correlated .92; analyses using both sites have yielded the
same results. WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 16 n. 10.
243 WAGUESPACK & SORENSON, supra note 20, at 17.
244 id
245 Id. These were also cross-referenced with "cast centrality" and a measure of potential
proto-typicality. Id. at 17-18.
246 Id. at 18.
247 id
248 id
249 id
250 Id. at 18-19.
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rating.25 I In other words, there is empirical proof that, first, MPAA members
are able to pressure CARA over their films' ratings or, second, that raters are
influenced by their knowledge of the producer's identity.252
This establishes that there truly is substantial deference given to
members of the MPAA through the CARA ratings system. The fact that the
ratings system is so vague 25 3 and submission to the system is practically
involuntary 254 lends a helping hand to allow the MPAA to show such great
deference to its members and to withstand criticism by hiding behind these
cloaks of rules and policies. This deference solidifies the existence of a
significant barrier to entry into the market and hinders anybody, except the
members of the MPAA, looking to become substantial players, regardless of
the quality of film produced. 25 5 The concentrated power of the members and
their desire to sustain that power has fed this anticompetitive practice that has
been coupled with their monopoly power.
Though the conclusion that the CARA ratings system serves as a
significant entry barrier to the motion picture industry seems apparent in light
of the evidence thus far, the MPAA has been able to divert criticism and hide
behind the ambiguity of the system.2 56 Further, the MPAA claims that it does
not disclose its raters, or their rating materials, in order to protect the safety and
independence of the individuals.25 7 This, along with ambiguity in the system,
provides a means for the MPAA to shield its practices, prolonging the existence
of the entry barrier and enabling the MPAA to divert any accusations of bias.
Part III.B.1.d details the MPAA practice of non-disclosure that
provides a shield from accountability, allowing the anticompetitive actions of
the MPAA to persist.
d. Rater Identities Remain Undisclosed
As mentioned above, 2 58 a board of parents who view each film and
collectively vote on the rating it deserves delivers the ratings administered by
CARA. 2 59 The MPAA explains that the "[r]atings are assigned by an
independent board of parents with no past affiliation to the movie business.
Their job is to rate each film as they believe a majority of American parents
251 Id. at 19.
252 Id. Even with the most conservative specification, MPAA members still have nearly a 7%
lower probability of receiving an R rating. Id. at 20.
253 See supra Part IIl.B.1.b.
254 See supra Part III.B.1.a.
255 See supra Part III.A.
256 See supra Part III.B.1.b.
257 See infra Part II1.B.1.d.
258 See supra Part II.A.3.
259 Smith, supra note 49; Film Ratings, supra note 197.
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would rate it, considering relevant themes and content." 2 60 What the MPAA
does not like to draw attention to is that the identities of the parent-raters are
kept secret and that the raters' ballots are at all times treated as confidential and
are not disclosed outside of the MPAA. 2 6 1 The MPAA usually employs
between ten and thirteen parent-raters whose identities are kept secret, though
there are three senior raters who oversee the process and whose names have
been disclosed under swelling public pressure to do so. 26 2 MPAA officials say
that the board members' identities are sealed in order to prevent pressures from
large studio executives or filmmakers from mounting on the raters.263 But
Director Kirby Dick, with his movie This Film is Not Yet Rated, proposes that
this anonymity allows the MPAA to act without any accountability.264 He says,
"City officials, school board officials, they make important decisions and their
identities are known. It's ludicrous to think that these people shouldn't be
,,265known, too. Their decisions can affect millions of dollars in business.
The MPAA requires that these undisclosed raters have children ranging
from ages five to fifteen; a rater is to be rotated out of the ratings board when
his or her child ages over eighteen.26 6 These board members have no special or
specific training in film or child behavior or psychology.26 7 The MPAA claims
that because the ratings system was designed for parents, the experience of
raising a child trumps any professional training in film or child psychology.268
The MPAA looks for average parents who "know what other parents think
about in terms of making choices for [their] children."2 69 This standard is so
subjectively applied by the raters that there is no way that all parents could be
represented in the ratings, as each parent has his or her own subjective standard
in determining what is appropriate for his or her child. It is a falsity to think the
subjective will of these raters is an empirical truth by which all parents will
willfully follow and adhere.
For a typical movie, eight raters view the motion picture, designating
the rating each believe to be appropriate (G, PG, PG-13, R, NC-17) and listing
260 MPAA Ratings, supra note 205.
261 Bowles, supra note 53; Smith, supra note 49.
262 Bowles, supra note 53.
263 id.
264 See THIs FILM is NOT YET RATED (Kirby Dick 2006).
265 Bowles, supra note 53. See Part III.B. La in further explaining what hinges on these ratings
in terms of potential profitability and success in the motion picture industry.
266 Bowles, supra note 53; How does the MPAA Rate Movies?, supra note 48. The sources
cited maintain conflicting views on the required age-range of parent-raters' children, including
the child's age at which the rater must be rotated from the ratings board. The more conservative
age range and limit was chosen in the context of the sentence accompanying this footnote.
267 Bowles, supra note 53.
268 id
269 id
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the factors used in making the decision, often citing violence, nudity, drug use,
language, and other similar factors.270 Because of this system and the vague
rating standards it entails, 271 we cannot simply ask the raters what is appropriate
and what needs to be done to fix an unsatisfying rating, as specifics are not
cited and the ballots remain confidential.272
The structure of the system thus provides a way for the raters to show
substantial deference to members, disadvantaging non-members upon their
compelled submission to the ratings system. This non-disclosure further
aggregates the power of the ratings entry barrier, amplifying the
anticompetitive conduct and further providing a means for the MPAA and its
members to maintain their monopoly power.
Part III.B.1.e suggests a simple, proven solution to help cure the
inadequacies of the CARA ratings system, alleviating some of the pressures the
MPAA applies on the market.
e. A Simple Fix
What, if anything, could ameliorate the MPAA's rating system as a
downstream barrier for its large player members? As mentioned above,273 other
organizations have been able to apply a more objective standard that informs
parents about certain levels of different themes in a movie, letting parents
determine what is important. For instance, Kids-in-Mind,274 unlike the MPAA,
does not assign an "inscrutable" rating based upon age but applies three
objective ratings for sex/nudity, violence/gore, and profanity.275 These three
ratings are on a scale of zero to ten and the site explains in much detail why a
film rates high or low in a specific category. 276 Kids-in-Mind also includes
instances of substance use, maintains a thorough list of discussion topics that
may elicit questions from children, and even provides an interpretation of the
message the film conveys to the audience. The site prides itself on its
objective standards and denies basing its ratings on the viewer's age or on the
270 Id. This harkens back to the "vagueness" of the ratings system in general and helps
demonstrate how the ratings are really up to the whims of the raters' mores, attitudes, and
preferences on the day the film is viewed.
271 See supra Part III.B.1.b.
272 Bowles, supra note 53.
273 See supra Part III.B.1.c.
274 See supra Part Ill.B.1.c for how Waguespack and Sorenson proved the consistency,
reliability, and effectiveness of these ratings in their piece The Ratings Game: Asymmetry in
Classifications.
275 KIDS IN MIND, supra note 241.
276 id
277 id
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artistic merits of a film. 278 As Kids-in-Mind and others have proven, there is a
more effective, objective, consistent system that would dissolve many of the
problems caused by the MPAA system.
The most extreme solution would be forcing the MPAA to cut all ties
from its members, becoming a completely independent agency receiving no
funding from studios but from rating fees and other revenue generators. As this
is highly unlikely due to the amount of financial support received from its
members, adopting a much more objective classification system to better stifle
any bias that may surface from the raters and the agency would cure the
inadequacies of the ratings system.
Adopting an objective standard, like the system used by Kids-in-Mind,
would ameliorate the qualms with the ridiculously vague and inconsistent
system; 279 would relieve raters of any pressure, allowing their identities to be
disclosed and holding them accountable for objective, detailed evaluations,
adding more validity and effectiveness to the system; 280 would destroy the
dependence on ratings and their correlations to revenue generating potential, as
producers would know what is and is not acceptable in different ratings
categories, ending the "pushing the envelope" practice; 281 and, lastly,
eliminating these barriers would leave no cloak for the MPAA to hide behind to
justify any deference given to its members. 282
Not only would the MPAA be more transparent, but this full disclosure
would let parents subjectively evaluate films based upon the values important
to them instead of those harbored by unknown raters. The raters would no
longer be the messengers of some seemingly empirical truth, but would simply
be conduits of information for parents and moviegoers alike. This result strikes
a resemblance to the purpose the MPAA hoped to serve in providing the
ratings.283 More stringent standards would dissolve the cloak behind which the
MPAA hides in operating to concentrate the monopoly power of its members,
exposing it to greater criticism and demanding that the deferential practice be
stopped. These changes, if made, could deconstruct the entry barrier created by
the ratings system, thereby making the MPAA and its members susceptible to
natural, aggressive competition.
278 Id. As mentioned in Part III.B.1.c, Kids-in-Mind and another independent ratings
organization, Screen It, correlate at .92 consistency based upon their objective standards.
279 See supra Part III.B. 1 .b.
280 See supra Part II.B. 1.d.
281 See supra Part III.B.1.a.
282 See supra Part III.B. 1.c.
283 See supra Part II.A.3.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the MPAA began with a positive outlook to save the motion
picture industry from government censorship by developing a system that
proved somewhat effective in the past, it has become obsolete and must
undergo certain innovations to survive.
The members of the MPAA, using the MPAA and CARA as its
antitrust conduit, have gained an increasingly concentrated share of the market,
approaching a dangerously high percentage in the United States. This
concentration and affiliation indicates the requisite monopoly power in the
relevant market for violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act; these markets
could be narrowed down or expanded, but regardless, due to the concentration
of media ownership, this monopoly power is in a relevant market. If it is
decided that the MPAA and its members have not reached the requisite
monopoly power for violation of the Act, there is most definitely a dangerous
probability that this monopoly power could result, given the .recent activity of
the organization and merger discussions in the industry, resulting in an
attempted monopolization violation.
Further, anticompetitive conduct has been demonstrated in operating
the ratings system (CARA) as an entry barrier to the market. The system's
vague, arbitrary, and inconsistent standards; its lack of accountability due to its
refusal to disclose its raters; and the false sense of "voluntary" submission to
the system have provided a conduit for the MPAA to show great deference to
its members, further concentrating their market power and ensuring their
sustainability.
The MPAA, through its members, or vice versa, has obtained, or is
obtaining, monopoly power in the motion picture industry and has constructed
a significant barrier of entry to the market, demonstrating anticompetitive
conduct that restricts industry competition in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
Simply dissolving member affiliations with the MPAA and introducing
objective standards in the ratings scheme would ameliorate the unfavorable
practices of the MPAA. If deference were still shown to members under the
new system, it would be readily identifiable, destroying the inadequacies
behind which the MPAA has hidden in the past, delegitimizing the system
completely.
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This funnel of bias through which the entire motion picture industry
must flow has overstepped its bounds and must give way to a system more
suitable for today's society and laws.
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"No art passes our conscience in the way film does, and goes directly to our feelings,
deep down into the dark rooms of our souls."
- Ingmar Bergman
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